The 2009 public debt crisis onset triggered a fundamental constitutional transformation of the European Union (EU). What is the link between this transformation and the enlargement policy? The authors of the article seek an answer to this question. The main thesis is that the method of impersonal authoritarianism in dealing with the Eurozone crisis spilled over into the EU enlargement policy. On the one hand, we consider the systemic reasons for turning the enlargement policy into an instrument of geopolitical control of the states on the outer periphery. On the other hand, the problem is considered from the point of view of Serbia’s interest as an EU membership candidate country. The authors conclude that opening space for innovation and flexibility in relations would be in the mutual interest of the EU and candidate countries. The analysis of the new enlargement policy reform proposal examines the readiness of European leaders to open the door for a new type of relations with the candidate countries that would correspond to today’s European reality of the historical interregnum.